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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
bodily harm at the time of the homicide. It would have
tended to negative intent and was thus relevant and admis-
sible under Article 441 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which provides: 'Relevant evidence is that tending * * to
negative the commission of the offense and the intent.' ",41
Criminal Law and Procedure
CRIMINAL LAW
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF FAMILY
Criminal Neglect of Family is defined in Article 74 of the
Criminal Code' as "the desertion or intentional non-support" of
a wife or "minor child" who is in necessitous circumstances. In
State v. Woods2 the court properly held that the term "minor
child" meant any child under twenty-one years of age, and
hence applied to a high school senior who had passed his seven-
teenth birthday. However, we may pause to question the court's
further holding that "the earnings of the father are not an
essential element of the crime of neglect of family," and that
"the father's duty to support is absolute. His failure to do so
constituted the offense."3 Since Article 74 requires the "inten-
tional" non-support, it would appear that a father who is finan-
cially unable to furnish such support should at least have an
affirmative defense. A normal construction of the language
employed in the statutory definition would only justify its
application to the parent who is able to furnish support and
wilfully refuses to do so. Possibly all the court means to hold
is that the state establishes its case by showing that the child
is in necessitous circumstances as a result of the parent's failure
to furnish proper support, and that the affirmative defense of
inability to furnish such support must be urged and proven
by the defense, just as reasonable mistake of fact and other
49. Id. at 857.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. R.S. 1950, 14:74.
2. 66 So. 2d 315 (La. 1953).
3. Justice Moise, id. at 317.
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exculpatory matters are raised by defense. If so construed,
the decision achieves a sound practical result. If construed to
mean that the parent's ability to furnish support is an imma-
terial consideration, the decision would be imposing a virtual
strict liability under a statutory provision which expressly stated
the requirement of a general criminal intent.
4
CRUELTY TO JUVENILES
In State v. Towns5 a father had been charged with standing
by while his wife inflicted a severe beating upon the couple's
young son. In holding that the failure to prevent the beating
did not constitute cruelty to juveniles, the Supreme Court cor-
rectly states that "Article 936 does not denounce the presence
of a bystander at the whipping of a juvenile as a crime."'7 The
question that is left somewhat hazy by Justice Moise's opinion
is whether, upon proper allegation and proof of the parental
relationship, the father's standing passively by while his young
son was beaten should constitute a cruelty to juveniles. It
should be noted that the statutory definition of the offense em-
braces "the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment
or neglect" of the juvenile. Justice Hawthorne's dissenting
opinion approves the juvenile court judge's conclusion that
since the defendant was the father of the child he was guilty
of criminal neglect in permitting him to be cruelly beaten and
whipped.8 A careful study of Justice Moise's majority opinion
indicates that the reversal of the conviction was predicated
on the insufficiency of the affidavit upon which the conviction
was based. In short, the affidavit failed to charge neglect for
it did not allege the parent-son relationship which would place
a special duty of protection on the defendant. In this regard
Justice Moise significantly states, "Merely 'permitting a juve-
nile to be struck, beaten and whipped' does not constitute a crime
under Art. 93, for even if provided by statute, which we deny,
some relationship at least must be alleged between the observer
or bystander and the juvenile cruelly mistreated." If additional
4. La. R.S. 1950, 14:11: ". . . in the absence of qualifying provisions,
the terms 'intent' and 'intentional' have reference to 'general criminal in-
tent'."
5. 222 La. 437, 62 So. 2d 634 (1952).
6. La. R.S. 1950, 14:93.
7. Justice Moise, 222 La. 437, 441, 62 So. 2d 634, 635.
8. 222 La. 437, 445, 62 So. 2d 634, 637.
9. 222 La. 437, 442, 62 So. 2d 634, 636.
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authority is necessary to establish the legal duty of the father
to interfere when cruel and unusual punishment is being meted
out by the mother, the Louisiana Civil Code expressly recog-
nizes the authority of the father as prevailing in case of differ-
ence between the parents. 10
PERJURY
The perjury conviction in State v. Conforto1' was based
upon a false oath executed by the defendant as a bail bond
surety. The oath falsely stated ownership of a specified piece of
New Orleans property when, according to the information charg-
ing the offense, the defendant "then and there well knew that
he was not the owner of said immovable property." The prin-
cipal issue on appeal was whether the false oath related "to
matter material to the issue or question in controversy," as
required for the crime of perjury. 12 The majority opinion, sus-
taining the conviction, held that the false allegation was "ma-
terial" since the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly pro-
vided that the surety must take oath "that after the payment
of all of his debts he is owner in his own right of property,
real or personal or both, liable to seizure, in an amount equal
to that named in said bond.' 1 3 The dissenting opinion stressed
the technical argument that only a general statement of finan-
cial responsibility is required of the surety; but Justice Haw-
thorne's majority opinion found ample support in other juris-
dictions for his conclusion that "a statement regarding particular
property is a matter material to the issue of the surety's suffi-
ciency on the bond, and that a false statement regarding par-
ticular property in an affidavit of suretyship is perjury."' 4
Chief Justice Fournet's dissenting opinion concludes with
the statement that "The last clause in Article 104 [Code of
Criminal Procedure]-'any surety who shall swear falsely to
any of the material facts set up in his affidavit of justification
shall be deemed guilty of perjury and upon conviction thereof,
shall be punished in accordance with law in such case made
and provided'-adds nothing and is without any effect unless
10. Art. 216, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. 222 La. 427, 62 So. 2d 630 (1952).
12. Art. 123, La. Crim. Code of 1942, La. R.S. 1950, 14:123.
13. Art. 103, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, La. R.S. 1950, 15:103.
14. 222 La. 427, 432, 62 So. 2d 630, 632 (1952), citing cases from New York,
Massachusetts and Michigan.
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it be to place the surety on guard that if in taking the required
oath he has sworn falsely he is subject to prosecution under
the criminal laws of this state."15 (Italics supplied.) This state-
ment is in agreement with the writer's belief that such provi-
sions should be disregarded, at least in statutes enacted before
the Criminal Code of 1942, and that the offense should be gov-
erned by the appropriate articles of that code.1- If this were
done, the offender's false non-judicial oath in the Conforto case
should have been prosecuted as False Swearing rather than as
Perjury. However, in State v. Smith" with Chief Justice O'Niell
writing the court's opinion, it was held that such special penal
provisions were not impliedly repealed by the inconsistent gen-
eral definitions of offenses in the criminal code. Apparently this
view was tacitly reaffirmed by the majority of the court when




After an indictment has been found or an information filed,
the granting of a preliminary examination is "wholly within
the discretion of the district court, and not subject to review
by any other court."' In such cases the grand jury's delibera-
tions, or the district attorney's investigations, insure good faith
and probable cause. Of course the preliminary examination may
be granted for the purpose of fixing bail, taking depositions of
witnesses who may be unavailable at the time of the trial, or
bonding key witnesses to appear. In State v. Gaspard2 a defen-
dant had been charged with theft of rice valued at $4,234.91, and
sought a preliminary examination, claiming that the charge was
unfounded and made to extort money from him. In upholding
the refusal to grant a preliminary hearing, the Supreme Court
15. 222 La. 427, 436, 62 So. 2d 630, 634.
16. Arts. 123-128, La. R.S. 1950, 14:123-128. For a complete discussion
of this point see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1944-
1945 Term, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 647 (1946).
17. 207 La. 735, 21 So. 2d 890 (1945).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 154, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:154.
2. 222 La. 222, 62 So. 2d 281 (1952).
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